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A License to Infringe: The Tenth Circuit’s Reliance on the 
Reasonable Observer Test to Determine Symbolic Speech 
Protection of License Plates 
Introduction 
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution holds, “Congress 
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .”1 While a plain 
reading of the First Amendment only seems to protect “speech,” courts 
“have long recognized that its protection does not end at the spoken or 
written word.”2 Although the Supreme Court has rejected “the view that an 
apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ whenever 
the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea,”3 it 
has “acknowledged that conduct may be ‘sufficiently imbued with elements 
of communication to fall within the scope of the First . . . Amendment[].”4 
While this broadening of speech protection is fitting, the absence of a 
concrete definition of what conduct deserves the protection of the First 
Amendment has divided courts and legal scholars for decades.5 
Specifically, ambiguous Supreme Court decisions regarding symbolic 
speech have left lower courts in disarray, each either utilizing a different 
version of, or completely disregarding, the same test.6 Courts have, 
                                                                                                                 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 2. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989). 
 3. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).  
 4. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404 (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974) 
(per curiam)). 
 5. See R. George Wright, What Counts as "Speech" in the First Place?: Determining 
the Scope of the Free Speech Clause, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 1217, 1225 (2010).  
 6. See, e.g., Cressman v. Thompson, 798 F.3d 938, 957-58 (10th Cir. 2015) (finding, at 
a minimum, that a claimant must articulate a message a viewer would perceive from a 
symbol to which he objects and that First Amendment protection is only afforded where the 
articulated message to which the claimant objects mirrors that of the “reasonable observer”); 
Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 381, 388-89 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding the 
particularized message portion of the Spence-Johnson test must not be narrow or succinctly 
articulable); Church of the Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik, 356 F.3d 197, 205 
n.6 (2d Cir. 2004) (finding the Spence-Johnson test to be the test for symbolic speech First 
Amendment protection); Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1270 (11th 
Cir. 2004) (relaxing the Spence-Johnson test by only requiring that a reasonable person 
would interpret any message as opposed to a specific message for the test for symbolic 
speech First Amendment protection); Tenafly Eruv Ass'n v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 
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however, consistently affirmed that one consideration has the potential to 
be a guidepost for categories of symbolic speech determinations: context. 
Adopting contextual considerations in every symbolic speech analysis is a 
much-needed stride towards uniformity in this area of law, which is 
becoming increasingly imperative as the way people convey messages 
continues to expand into new forums of abstract expression.7 As more and 
more types of symbolic speech forms come before courts, the utilization of 
context as a guiding factor in determining free speech protection can aid 
courts in promptly and uniformly adapting to these new forms.8  
In Cressman v. Thompson,9 the Tenth Circuit determined whether the 
First Amendment accorded protection to symbolic speech in the context of 
license plates featuring Native American religious symbols. Although its 
analysis was not an unreasonable interpretation of Supreme Court 
precedent, the court’s complete reliance on the “reasonable observer’s” 
perception of the symbol at issue improperly limits the scope of reasonable 
objections that complainants may make regarding symbolic speech 
displayed on state-issued license plates. Under the Tenth Circuit’s holding, 
citizens are essentially compelled to either display the words and symbols 
on a state-issued license plate—which is affixed on private property for 
numerous people to see—or suffer a penalty.10 Thus, in the specific context 
of license plates, where citizens are compelled to communicate a message 
of the government’s choosing, the components of the symbolic speech test 
historically used by courts11 should only be used as persuasive, not 
mandatory, factors in the determination of symbolic speech protection. 
Further, where the complainant’s interpretation of the symbol is (1) 
                                                                                                                 
144, 160 (3d Cir. 2002) (finding the particularized message portion of the Spence-Johnson 
test to be unnecessary for the test for symbolic speech First Amendment protection).  
 7. See Caitlin Housley, A Uniform Test Isn't Here Right Now, but Please Leave a 
Message: How Altering the Spence Symbolic Speech Test Can Better Meet the Needs of an 
Expressive Society, 103 KY. L.J. 657, 658 (2015) (“[P]eople rely on technology, clothing, 
hairstyles, brands, and even tattoos to express their personalities and send messages about 
what they value in life.”). 
 8. See id. 
 9. 798 F.3d 938. 
 10. Obscuring any part of a state-issued license plate is illegal under Oklahoma law, see 
47 OKLA. STAT. § 1113(A)(2) (2011), so Cressman’s options were to either 1) obscure the 
Native American image and be subject to prosecution, or 2) pay an extra fee for a specialty 
license plate. 
 11. The symbolic speech test historically used by courts is the Spence-Johnson test, 
which requires (1) an intent to convey a particularized message and (2) a great likelihood 
that the message will be understood by viewers. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 
410-11 (1974) (per curiam). 
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reasonable and (2) ideological, his or her First Amendment claim should be 
successful and, at the very least, he or she should be allowed to display a 
specialty license plate for the same price as a state-issued license plate.  
Part I of this Note examines how the jurisprudence of symbolic speech 
has evolved since its emergence in Spence v. Washington12 and Texas v. 
Johnson.13 Part II discusses how the doctrines of compelled and 
governmental speech have impacted the courts’ free speech analysis of 
state-issued license plates. Next, Part III provides an overview of the Tenth 
Circuit’s Cressman v. Thompson decision involving speech protection of 
symbols found on Oklahoma’s state-issued license plate.14 Finally, Part IV 
discusses how (1) the Cressman court improperly relied on the reasonable-
observer test to reach its holding, and (2) implicit in the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of 
Boston15 is a need for a flexible test for symbolic speech protection, 
requiring the consideration of context. Thus, in the specific context of 
license plates, a citizen’s reasonable and ideological interpretation of the 
message on a license plate to which he or she objects should afford him or 
her the free speech protection of the First Amendment.  
I. Symbolic Speech Jurisprudence  
A. Spence v. Washington and Texas v. Johnson: The Emergence of the Test 
The Supreme Court first articulated a test for assessing the First 
Amendment protection of symbolic speech in Spence v. Washington.16 In 
Spence, a college student hung an American flag out of his apartment 
window on private property.17 Contrary to custom, the American flag was 
positioned upside down and with peace signs made out of black tape 
attached to the front and back.18 The student explained that he “wanted 
people to know that [he] thought America stood for peace.”19 The flag was 
noticeable to passersby, including police officers, who seized the flag and 
                                                                                                                 
 12. 418 U.S. 405. 
 13. 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
 14. 798 F.3d 938. 
 15. 515 U.S. 557 (1995). 
 16. 418 U.S. at 410-11.  
 17. Id. at 406. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 409. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017
322 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:319 
 
 
arrested the student for violating a State of Washington improper-use 
statute.20 
The Court recognized that although the student’s message was not 
conveyed via spoken word, he was still “engaged in a form of 
communication.”21 Thus, the issue was “whether his activity was 
sufficiently imbued with elements of communication to fall within the scope 
of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.”22 In its analysis, the Court 
recognized the communicative value of flags as symbols, as well as the 
context in which the student used the flag and peace sign as symbols.23 
Based on these considerations, the state’s improper-use statue was held to 
be unconstitutional as applied to the expressions of the student—who was 
attempting to send a message about peace24—as it would likely be 
understood by those who viewed it due to the then-current governmental 
domestic and foreign affairs.25 According to this test, symbolic speech is 
protected by the First Amendment where there is “[a]n intent to convey a 
particularized message . . . and in the surrounding circumstances the 
likelihood [is] great that the message [will] be understood by those who 
view[] it.”26  
The test articulated in Spence was reaffirmed in Texas v. Johnson,27 
where Johnson burned an American flag at the 1984 Republican National 
Convention to protest certain Reagan administration policies.28 The Court 
held that because Johnson’s conduct was both expressive and overtly 
political, it was “intentional and overwhelmingly apparent,” and thus 
deserving of First Amendment protection.29  
The Court’s analysis in these two cases has come to be known as the 
Spence-Johnson test, under which symbolic speech is protected by the First 
Amendment if there is (1) an intent to convey a particularized message and 
(2) a great likelihood that the message will be understood by viewers.30 
                                                                                                                 
 20. Id. at 406-07. 
 21. Id. at 409. 
 22. Id. (emphasis added).  
 23. Id. at 410. 
 24. The student testified that the upside-down peace signs on the flag were intended to 
protest the United States’ invasion of Cambodia and the killings at Kent State University in 
1970. Id. at 408. 
 25. See id. at 410.  
 26. Id. at 410-11. 
 27. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).  
 28. Id. at 399.  
 29. See id. at 406. 
 30. See Spence, 418 U.S. at 410-11. 
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Simple though this test may appear, lower courts have struggled to apply it 
uniformly due to their varying interpretations of the Supreme Court’s use of 
the test in Hurley,31 resulting in confusion regarding the scope of protection 
afforded to various forms of symbolic speech.32 
B. Hurley v. GLIB: Source of Disarray 
Undoubtedly seeing the problems with the application of the Spence-
Johnson test, the Court once again addressed the issue of symbolic speech 
in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston.33 
Although Hurley mainly dealt with the expressive content of parades 
protected by the First Amendment,34 the Court also noted problems with the 
Spence-Johnson test.35 According to the Hurley Court, “a narrow, 
succinctly articulable message is not a condition of constitutional 
protection, which if confined to expressions conveying a ‘particularized 
message,’ would never reach the unquestionably shielded painting of 
Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schoenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of 
Lewis Carroll.”36 Although the Court attempted to provide clarity regarding 
the Spence-Johnson test by noting the requirement of a particularized 
message may not always reach apparent constitutionally protected symbolic 
speech,37 the only thing that is clear after Hurley is that lower courts are 
even more confused as to when symbolic speech prompts First Amendment 
protection.38 This uncertainty—and, consequently, the conflicting opinions 
of lower courts—is inconsistent with the values of justice and fairness that 
the judicial system strives to embody. The Supreme Court tried to alleviate 
the symbolic speech problem in Hurley by recognizing that the Spence-
Johnson test may not always adequately recognize protected symbolic 
speech, but it ultimately enlarged the problem.39 First Amendment 
protections are the cornerstone of America’s free, democratic society, and 
accordingly the Court should articulate a clear test for symbolic speech that 
will allow for a uniform application and protect symbolic speech when 
appropriate.  
                                                                                                                 
 31. 515 U.S. 557 (1995). 
 32. See cases cited supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 33. 515 U.S. 557.  
 34. See id. at 559. 
 35. See id. at 569. 
 36. Id. (citation omitted). 
 37. See id.  
 38. See cases cited supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 39. See cases cited supra note 6. 
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II. License Plate Jurisprudence: Compelled and Government Speech 
In the specific context of state-issued license plates, issues pertaining to 
symbolic speech have been further complicated by the need to consider the 
doctrines of compelled speech and government speech. The compelled 
speech doctrine provides that “the right of freedom of thought protected by 
the First Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak 
freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.”40 Government speech, 
on the other hand, “allows the government [as the speaker] to make content 
based choices when it comes to speech,” just like a private citizen.41 
Although this appears to indicate that the government lacks any restraint in 
expressing government speech, “the Free Speech Clause itself may 
constrain the government’s speech if . . . the government seeks to compel 
private persons to convey the government’s speech.”42 Such an issue has 
arisen in every level of the courts in the context of state-issued license 
plates, where the plates contain words and symbols of the government’s 
choosing and are required to be affixed to the private property of all citizens 
driving automobiles, subsequently compelling them to display the 
government’s message. 
A. Walker v. Texas: License Plates Are Government Speech 
While there had been tension in lower courts relating to whether speech 
on state-issued license plates was government or private speech, Cressman 
recognized that Walker v. Texas explicitly settled the issue.43 In Walker, the 
Court held that specialty license plates issued by the State of Texas were 
government speech because, just like state-issued non-specialty license 
plates, each plate serves a governmental purpose, the government approves 
of the contents of the plate, and states have long used license plates to 
                                                                                                                 
 40. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977); see W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. 
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633-34 (1943). 
 41. David Mangone, Speech at a Crossroads: The Intersection of Symbolic Speech, 
Government Speech, and the State License Plate, 8 FED. CTS. L. REV. 97, 108 (2014); see 
Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2245 (2015) 
(“When government speaks, it is not barred by the Free Speech Clause from determining the 
content of what it says.”). 
 42. Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2246. 
 43. See Cressman v. Thompson, 798 F.3d 938, 965 (10th Cir. 2015) (McHugh, J., 
concurring). 
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convey governmental messages.44 Therefore, state-issued license plates 
present compelled speech that may implicate the First Amendment, since 
speech on license plates is government speech and physical license plates 
must be affixed to private persons’ vehicles.45 With the issue of 
determining which category of speech license plates most appropriately fit 
being settled, the Court next grappled with license plate compelled speech 
in the form of an express message.  
B. Wooley v. Maynard: A Successful Objection to a Morally Repugnant 
License Plate 
Wooley v. Maynard involved license plates and compelled express 
government speech—not symbolic speech.46 In Wooley, the issue 
surrounded New Hampshire’s state-issued license plates, which contained 
the written phrase “Live Free or Die.”47 The Maynards, a married couple 
asserting membership in the Jehovah’s Witnesses faith, found the phrase to 
be repugnant to their religious beliefs and subsequently covered that portion 
of the license plate affixed to their vehicle.48 Covering any part of a license 
plate violates New Hampshire state law, and consequently the husband was 
arrested.49 The Maynards then brought an action to enjoin enforcement of 
the statute where, upon appeal, the Court held that a citizen may not be 
required by the State to disseminate an ideological message “by displaying 
it on his private property in a manner and for the express purpose that it be 
observed and read by the public.”50 With this holding, the Court recognized 
that a state has no right to “require[] that [individuals] use their private 
property as a ‘mobile billboard’ for the State’s ideological message—or 
suffer a penalty . . . .”51 Although this holding clearly addressed the 
constitutionality of express ideological messages on license plates, the 
outcome of a compelled-speech objection to displaying a license plate in 
                                                                                                                 
 44. See Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2249-50. 
 45. See Cressman, 798 F.3d at 949 (quoting Walker, 135 U.S. at 2252-53) (“[E]ven 
though license plate designs may be government speech, drivers ‘convey the messages 
communicated through those designs,’ and a State runs afoul of the First Amendment if it 
‘compel[s] a party to express a view with which the private party disagrees.’” (citations 
omitted)). 
 46. 430 U.S. 705 (1977). 
 47. Id. at 706-07. 
 48. Id. at 707-08. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 713. 
 51. Id. at 715. 
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instances where the government message is less clear, as with symbolic 
speech, remains unsettled. 
C. The Uncertainty of Symbolic Speech and License Plates 
While it is established that state-issued license plates are government 
speech, which only implicate First Amendment protections where the 
government seeks to compel private persons to convey a message that they 
find morally objectionable,52 determining the government’s message is still 
unclear—particularly when the message is in the form of a symbol.53 
Although symbolic-speech jurisprudence may be characterized as a sea of 
uncertainty, as evidenced by the multitude of variations of the Spence-
Johnson test utilized by lower courts, a common thread in nearly every 
symbolic-speech case is the consideration of context.54 In the specific 
context of license plates, the Tenth Circuit’s approach to determining 
symbolic-speech protections in Cressman v. Thompson improperly denied 
the First Amendment right to refrain from speaking.  
III. Cressman v. Thompson 
Pursuant to title 47, section 1113.3 of the Oklahoma Statutes, the 
Oklahoma License Plate Design Task Force was created in 2007 to update 
the Oklahoma state-issued license plate.55 Because one of the goals in the 
plate redesign was to specifically “market Oklahoma as a tourist 
destination,” the resulting design included the words “Native America” and 
an image of a Native American shooting an arrow into the sky (the “Native 
American image”).56 The Native American image is based on an Allan 
Houser sculpture, Sacred Rain Arrow, “which depicts the story of a young 
Apache warrior who fired an arrow that was blessed by a medicine man 
into the heavens; as the tale goes, the arrow carried prayers for rain to the 
Spirit World.”57 
  
                                                                                                                 
 52. See id. at 715-17. 
 53. See cases cited supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 54. See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 
576-77 (1995); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974) (per curiam); Tinker v. Des 
Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 510 (1969); Cressman v. Thompson, 798 
F.3d 938, 953 (10th Cir. 2015); Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 381, 395 (6th 
Cir. 2005). 
 55. Cressman, 798 F.3d at 943.  
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
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A. Cressman’s Objection and Failed Remedial Attempts 
Keith Cressman claimed to hold “historic Christian beliefs,” including 
monotheism, and consequently objected to the Native American image on 
the Oklahoma license plate because he believed it conveyed the same 
message as that behind the Sacred Rain Arrow sculpture, including 
teachings about “multiple gods” and “the arrow [as] an intermediary for 
prayer.”58 
Based on his contrary beliefs, Cressman made several attempts to avoid 
displaying the Native American image.59 Cressman covered up the Native 
American image on his license plate, but was informed by the Oklahoma 
Tax Commission’s Tag Agency that doing so was illegal.60 The Tax 
Commission then told him that he could buy a specialty license plate 
without the Native American image for an extra charge.61 While Cressman 
did buy specialty license plates at an increased price for a time, he later 
notified numerous state officials that he did not want to pay more for a 
specialty license plate and instead wished to either cover up the Native 
American image on a standard license plate or obtain a specialty license 
plate at no additional charge.62 Cressman received no response to his 
request and in November 2011 filed a civil-rights lawsuit pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights 
were violated by being forced by the State of Oklahoma to display the 
Native American image carrying a pantheistic message in conflict with his 
personal beliefs.63 
After the district court ruled that Cressman’s First Amendment rights 
were not violated,64 Cressman appealed to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, which considered whether Cressman “ha[d] 
been unconstitutionally compelled to speak by Oklahoma’s requirement 
that he either display the Native American image on his vehicle license 
plate or pay an extra fee for a specialty plate.”65 To make a valid 
compelled-speech claim, the court explained that “a party must establish (1) 
speech; (2) to which he objects; that is (3) compelled by some 
                                                                                                                 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id.; 47 OKLA. STAT. §§ 1113(A)(2), 1151(A)(2) (2011 & Supp. 2012). 
 61. Cressman, 798 F.3d at 943-44. 
 62. Id. at 944. 
 63. Id.  
 64. See id. 
 65. Id. at 950. 
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governmental action.”66 Thus, the court considered (1) whether the Native 
American image was pure or symbolic speech, and, if so, (2) whether 
Cressman objected to the message it conveys.67 
B. Not Pure, But Symbolic Speech 
The Tenth Circuit found that the Native American image was not pure 
speech.68 The court explained that pure-speech analysis is performed on a 
case-by-case basis, and the context of the message guides the court’s 
decision.69 Because the image could be found on thousands of license plates 
throughout Oklahoma, and because such a plate "is not an exercise of self-
expression entitled to pure-speech protection,” the Native American image 
is not pure speech.70 
The court next assessed whether the Native American image is symbolic 
speech that implicates the First Amendment.71 After discussing the 
historical jurisprudence of symbolic speech protection under Spence and 
Johnson, the court turned to Hurley, the source of lower court disarray.72 
The Tenth Circuit asserted, “[T]he Court’s decision in Hurley ‘suggested 
the Spence-Johnson factors are not necessarily prerequisites for First 
Amendment protection for symbolic speech.”73 It then noted the “divergent 
approaches” courts have taken to reconcile Hurley with the Spence-Johnson 
test, and stated that the Tenth Circuit has “merely observe[d] that Hurley 
suggests that a Spence-Johnson particularized message standard may at 
times be too high a bar for First Amendment protection,” but that it has 
never articulated a specific test post-Hurley.74  
C. Avoiding the Problem of Hurley and Banking on the Reasonable 
Observer 
The Tenth Circuit then asserted that, while it is difficult to find a 
common approach for assessing symbolic speech protection under the First 
Amendment across circuits, “at a minimum they require that the display be 
of such a character that a viewer could draw an identifiable inference from 
                                                                                                                 
 66. Id. at 951. 
 67. See id. at 950. 
 68. See id. at 952-54. 
 69. See id. at 953. 
 70. Id. at 950. 
 71. See id. at 954. 
 72. See id. at 955-56. 
 73. Id. at 955 (citing Cressman v. Thompson (Cressman I), 719 F.3d 1139, 1149 (10th 
Cir. 2013)).  
 74. Id. at 956 (alteration in original) (citing Cressman I, 719 F.3d at 1150). 
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it.”75 Therefore, “the Spence-Johnson test—even if modified by Hurley—
would oblige Mr. Cressman to articulate some inference drawn from the 
image that a viewer would perceive.”76 
Although Cressman alleged that a viewer of the Native American image 
would associate it with the Apache legend, pantheism, and prayer, the court 
disagreed.77 In reaching that conclusion, the court used a method never 
explicitly utilized by other courts in this type of analysis. Because the 
district court and the parties discussed the Establishment Clause’s 
“reasonable observer test” in assessing what a viewer of the symbol would 
perceive, the Tenth Circuit decided to use this test, as it "appear[s] to be 
congruent with symbolic-speech jurisprudence[ because] in that area [of 
symbolic speech], courts have focused on whether a display communicates 
a message that is identifiable by reasonable persons.”78 As a result, the 
court referred back to Spence, asserting that: 
[I]n the symbolic-speech context, the reasonable person focuses 
on “context [to] give meaning to [a] symbol” and is cognizant of 
the “then-current domestic and foreign affairs of his 
government,” “issue[s] of intense public concern,” the 
“environment” in which an expressive act occurs, and the 
reasons for the speaker’s expression.79 
In analyzing the Native American image within the bounds of the 
Establishment Clause’s reasonable observer test, the court discussed that 
while the reasonable observer would be aware of the Houser sculpture and 
the Apache legend, he would also be aware of other important contextual 
factors80 including: the license plate designers’ aim to promote tourism with 
the selected image; Oklahoma’s Native American history; and the public, 
the Oklahoma Department of Tourism, and the Oklahoma Department of 
Public Safety’s opportunity to provide input to the license plate task force.81 
The court determined that, based on his knowledge, the reasonable observer 
would not view the Oklahoma license plate as communicating the message 
of the Sacred Rain Arrow sculpture, but rather “that Oklahoma’s history 
                                                                                                                 
 75. Id. at 957. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See id. at 957, 960. 
 78. Id. at 958. 
 79. Id. at 958 (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410 (1974) (per curiam)). 
 80. Id. at 959-60. 
 81. Id.  
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and culture has been strongly influenced by Native Americans.”82 
Cressman did not object to this message.83 In fact, Cressman repeatedly 
stated throughout litigation that he did not object to the message of 
Oklahoma’s Native American history and culture.84 Instead, he objected to 
a message regarding the Sacred Rain Arrow, which the court believed he 
incorrectly asserted the Oklahoma license plate conveys based on his 
subjective misunderstanding of the Native American image’s message.85 
Thus, the court held that although the Native American image is symbolic 
speech, Cressman did not find the message it conveys to be unacceptable 
and was not compelled to speak by the State in violation of his First 
Amendment rights.86 
IV. While Technically Not Wrong, the Tenth Circuit Was Not Right 
A. The Cressman Court Improperly Relied on the Reasonable-Observer 
Test to Determine First Amendment Protection of Symbolic Speech on 
License Plates 
In reaching the determination that Cressman was not compelled to speak 
in violation of his First Amendment rights, the Tenth Circuit articulated a 
problematic approach to determining the message of symbolic speech by 
borrowing the Establishment Clause’s reasonable observer test, and, 
accordingly, did not reach the best decision.87 This test was prompted by 
and contingent upon the court’s assertion that symbolic-speech 
jurisprudence, at a minimum, requires an inference to be drawn from the 
image which a reasonable viewer would perceive.88 By wholly relying on 
the Establishment Clause’s reasonable observer test in determining whether 
Cressman had the right to refrain from displaying the Native American 
image on his license plate, the Tenth Circuit ignored and abandoned the 
fundamental principles of free speech. A citizen’s First Amendment right to 
free speech is a personal right, allowing him or her to speak or refuse to 
speak for any reason or absolutely no reason.89 Utilizing the reasonable 
                                                                                                                 
 82. Id. at 960. 
 83. See id. at 950-51, 963.  
 84. See id.  
 85. See id. at 963. 
 86. See id. at 963-64. 
 87. See id. at 958-60. 
 88. See id. at 958. 
 89. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (“[T]he right of freedom of 
thought protected by the First Amendment against state action includes both the right to 
speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.”).  
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observer test in assessing symbolic speech confines free speech protection 
to the limited message that a group of judges determines a reasonable 
observer would perceive from an image on a license plate—an outcome that 
results in the deterioration of constitutional rights.  
With its ruling in Cressman, the Tenth Circuit formulated a new standard 
for analyzing free speech claims involving symbolic and compelled speech. 
Not only is the symbolic-speech message of the debated image confined to 
what the court deems a reasonable observer would perceive, but the 
complainant must specifically articulate the reasonable observer’s 
perception and object to it in order to make a successful claim.90 
Furthermore, if the complainant’s objection is not identical to the specific 
perception of the reasonable observer, he or she has no valid claim and no 
choice but to display the image.91 This requirement is not consistent with 
the Supreme Court’s treatment of compelled-speech cases, specifically in 
those involving license plates.  
B. Compelled Speech and License Plates: At Odds With the Tenth’s 
Circuit’s Exclusive Use of the “Reasonable Observer” 
The Supreme Court explained that license plates are essentially “mobile 
billboard[s]” on display to hundreds of people daily, as driving an 
automobile is “a virtual necessity for most Americans.”92 Once words or 
images have been classified as speech, a citizen should not be forced to say 
or display the message, regardless of his reason for doing or not doing so. 
Thus, by forcing a citizen to either display an image he or she finds 
objectionable that may be classified as symbolic speech on a license plate 
or suffer a penalty, the citizen is compelled to speak by the government in 
violation of his or her First Amendment rights.93 Furthermore, the approach 
of limiting successful symbolic-speech claims to those where the claimant 
articulates an objection identical to what the court deems a reasonable 
observer would perceive improperly disregards established jurisprudence 
involving symbolic speech.94  
In Wooley, the Court found that a citizen’s First Amendment rights were 
violated when he was compelled to display the state-issued license plate 
                                                                                                                 
 90. Cressman, 798 F.3d at 956-57. 
 91. See id.  
 92. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715. 
 93. See id. at 714-15.  
 94. See generally Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 
2239 (2015); Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557 
(1995); Wooley, 430 U.S. 705. 
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including the words “Live Free or Die.”95 While most of the citizens in the 
state had no issue with the phrase being displayed on their license plates, 
what most citizens feel about something “is not the test.”96 The Maynards’ 
personal objection to the motto determined whether their right to free 
speech was violated because “[t]he First Amendment protects the right of 
individuals to hold a point of view different from the majority and to refuse 
to foster . . . an idea they find morally objectionable.”97 As members of the 
Jehovah’s Witnesses faith, the Maynards personally found the phrase 
morally, politically, and religiously repugnant, since they believed that “life 
is more precious than freedom.”98 Thus, even if every other citizen of New 
Hampshire had no objection to the license plate motto, the Maynards’ First 
Amendment rights were abridged when they were forced to display the 
plate even though they found the speech objectionable.99 The Court did not 
consider what a reasonable observer would perceive the motto 
communicated, nor did it consider that the State sought to convey a 
message of “appreciation of history, state pride, and individualism.”100 The 
Court only considered what the Maynards personally perceived to 
determine whether their personal constitutional rights had been violated.101 
Although Wooley involved speech in the form of words, the personal 
nature of the right to free speech applies with equal force to speech in the 
form of images. In Walker, the Court found that the State of Texas could 
not be forced to include a Confederate flag on one of its specialty license 
plates because the license plates constituted government speech and the 
government, just like private parties, cannot be forced to convey a 
particular message.102 In reaching this holding, the Court did not require the 
State to articulate the message that a reasonable observer would perceive in 
viewing the image of the Confederate flag, nor was the State required to 
object to that specific perception to have a successful claim.103 The State 
merely objected to the image, and the Court held that forcing the State to 
display the image would violate the First Amendment.104 
                                                                                                                 
 95. See 430 U.S. at 715, 717.  
 96. Id. at 715. 
 97. Id.  
 98. Id. at 707 n.2. 
 99. See id. at 717. 
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 101. See id. at 715.  
 102. Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2253 
(2015). 
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Additionally, in Hurley the Court evaluated symbolic speech in the form 
of a parade, never pondering the reasonable observer’s perception of the 
respondent’s float or requiring that Hurley specifically object to that 
perception.105 The Court found that Hurley had the right to refuse to allow 
the respondent’s participation in the parade because, “whatever the reason, 
it boils down to the choice of a speaker not to propound a particular point of 
view, and that choice is presumed to lie beyond the government’s power to 
control.”106 
Wooley, Hurley, and Walker highlight a fundamental principle—free 
speech is a personal right that allows a citizen to speak or refrain from 
speaking for any reason or no reason at all. Thus, contrary to the approach 
of the Tenth Circuit in Cressman, the reasonable observer has no business 
being used exclusively in the analysis.  
C. One Symbol, Numerous Interpretations  
Speech in any form is subject to multiple interpretations.107 Not only do 
words have different meanings in different contexts, but so do symbols, 
making symbolic speech and its protection under the First Amendment an 
area of significant confusion and controversy. Although allowing First 
Amendment protection to encompass any interpretation of a symbol would 
be overbroad, simply confining that protection to what a court deems a 
reasonable observer would perceive from a symbol is too narrow to 
sufficiently protect the rights of citizens to speak or refrain from speaking 
in every context. When a citizen voluntarily waves an upside-down flag 
displaying a peace sign on his private property,108 utilizing the perception of 
the reasonable observer to determine the message of the symbolic speech 
may be appropriate and useful.109 However, when a court determines the 
                                                                                                                 
 105. See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557 
(1995). 
 106. Id. at 575. 
 107. See Wright, supra note 5, at 1245 (“[A]udience members may perceive a fairly wide 
range of intended messages, and in some cases, only a fraction of the audience will perceive 
any intended message, let alone the actual intended message. But then, the speaker may 
intend different messages for different audience members, for various, legitimate reasons. 
Different messages intended for different audience members should hardly deprive the 
speech of its character as speech for First Amendment purposes.”). 
 108. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 406 (1974) (per curiam).  
 109. The reasonable observer test is appropriate in this circumstance because the 
claimant is seeking to invoke his First Amendment right to free speech to protect expressive 
conduct he created (hanging a flag with an upside down peace sign out of a window) and 
was not compelled to display, as opposed to a situation like Keith Cressman’s, where the 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017
334 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:319 
 
 
constitutional protection of symbolic speech where a citizen is compelled to 
display a symbol, such as an image or phrase on a license plate, exclusive 
use of the reasonable observer test does not adequately protect citizens’ 
constitutional rights because the citizens did not choose the license plate 
design—unlike the boy who chose to display the upside-down flag 
exhibiting a peace sign—but instead were compelled to display the license 
plate or suffer a penalty. In this situation, what a reasonable observer 
perceives a symbol to communicate wholly disregards other logical 
interpretations and perceptions of the symbol, as the meaning behind a 
symbol is rarely limited to one logical interpretation.110 Thus, because 
symbolic speech in the compelled-speech context is unique, Hurley should 
not be interpreted as making the Spence-Johnson test either wholly 
necessary or unnecessary for First Amendment protection of symbolic 
speech; rather, the test should be viewed as providing optional factors for 
consideration of symbolic speech protection.  
D. Hurley: Dispensing With the Rigid Spence-Johnson Test In Favor of 
Flexibility 
Recognizing the difficulties that the Spence-Johnson test presented for 
citizens bringing symbolic-speech claims, a reasonable interpretation of the 
Court’s opinion in Hurley is that it dispensed with the factors as 
prerequisites.111 The Court’s statement that “a narrow, succinctly articulable 
message is not a condition of constitutional protection”112 may fairly lead to 
the conclusion that the first factor of the Spence-Johnson test, a 
particularized message, is not required in assessing the constitutional 
protection accorded to symbolic speech. Further, the Court’s failure to 
address the second factor of the Spence-Johnson test, the likelihood that the 
message would be understood by viewers,113 also may reasonably lead to 
the conclusion that it is not a requirement. The Tenth Circuit in Cressman 
                                                                                                                 
government created the speech (the Native American image on a license plate) which he is 
compelled to display, contrary to his personal objections. Where a party is compelled to 
speak, the reasonable observer may not encompass his perception of the symbol to which he 
objects. The differing motives of the creators of symbolic speech under scrutiny should 
dictate the appropriateness of the “reasonable observer” test.  
 110. For example, an image of a covered wagon may be interpreted by some to represent 
the pioneer days in the United States or the migration of settlers to the west in colonial times, 
and may represent to others the University of Oklahoma mascot, the Sooner Schooner.  
 111. See cases cited supra note 6. 
 112. See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 569 
(1995). 
 113. See Spence, 418 U.S. at 410-11. 
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even noted that “the Court’s decision in Hurley ‘suggested the Spence-
Johnson factors are not necessarily prerequisites for First Amendment 
protection for symbolic speech.’”114 The Tenth Circuit nonetheless 
incorrectly relied entirely on the second element of the Spence-Johnson test 
by analyzing whether a reasonable observer would perceive the Native 
American image to communicate the same message to which Cressman 
objected.115 
E. The Common Thread of Context 
Although the Tenth Circuit’s analysis and holding can fit within an 
interpretation of symbolic-speech jurisprudence, the same can be said for 
virtually any symbolic-speech analysis due to the Court’s lack of apparent 
direction in Hurley and beyond. The Court has already explicitly ruled that 
a citizen may refrain from communicating the ideological messages on 
state-issued license plates if that citizen disagrees with those messages, and 
that forcing a citizen to display those messages is compelled speech.116 
While First Amendment protection is dependent upon whether the words or 
symbols are classified as speech, one common thread in nearly every free 
speech case is the Court’s consideration of context.117  
1. The Context of License Plates 
In the context of license plates, where citizens are forced to display on 
their private property the state-issued license plate containing the state’s 
chosen words or symbols, a citizen should be able to object to being forced 
to display his or her reasonable interpretation of the message. This is not to 
say that a citizen may object to a license plate image like the Native 
American image because it offends him in any way imaginable, such as 
offending his anti-war beliefs by including a bow and arrow. Conversely, 
when a citizen has a free-speech objection to a message on a license plate, 
courts should consider his or her specific objection and determine whether 
such an interpretation of the message is (1) reasonable and (2) 
ideological.118  
                                                                                                                 
 114. Cressman v. Thompson, 798 F.3d 938, 955 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting Cressman I, 
719 F.3d 1139, 1149 (10th Cir. 2013)).  
 115. See id. at 958. 
 116. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977). 
 117. See cases cited supra note 54 and accompanying text; see also Spence, 418 U.S. at 
410 (“[T]he context in which a symbol is used for purposes of expression is important, for 
the context may give meaning to the symbol.”). 
 118. Ideological considerations could include those ideals protected by the United States 
Constitution, i.e., freedom of religion or the right to bear arms.  
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Confining the message of symbolic speech merely to what a reasonable 
observer would attribute to the symbol offends the underlying premise of 
free speech in the First Amendment—the right of citizens “to hold a point 
of view different from the majority and to refuse to foster . . . an idea they 
find morally objectionable”119—a premise the Tenth Circuit failed to stay 
true to in its Cressman decision. 
2. The Tenth Circuit’s Narrow Contextual Analysis 
In Cressman, the Tenth Circuit noted that the reasonable observer would 
have knowledge of the Sacred Rain Arrow sculpture and the legend behind 
it.120 But it also stated that the reasonable observer would know about the 
tourism-based motivation of the legislators who designed the plate.121 
Instead of acknowledging that some Oklahomans, like Cressman, would 
possess knowledge of the legend behind the Native American image, and 
lack knowledge about the legislative intent behind the license plate design, 
the Tenth Circuit confined the only viable free-speech objection to the 
intent of the Oklahoma legislators by asserting that to be the reasonable 
observer’s perception of the Native American image.122 While relying on an 
almost omniscient reasonable observer’s interpretation of speech in some 
circumstances may be appropriate, it is not appropriate in the context of 
license plates. As a result, an objector’s reasonable and ideological 
interpretation of the speech on a license plate should invoke First 
Amendment protection when he or she is being compelled to speak by 
displaying a state-issued license plate. Although most Oklahomans 
presumably do not have an objection to the Native American image, Keith 
Cressman does.123 Regardless of what his objection is, he should not be 
compelled to display the message on a “mobile billboard” where his 
objection is both reasonable and ideological. Under the Tenth Circuit’s 
reasoning, if Cressman had found the Native American history of 
Oklahoma to be offensive, this would be enough for his claim to be 
successful because it is what the reasonable observer would perceive from 
the Native American image.124 However, Cressman’s much more 
understandable claim of a religious nature is not enough because it does not 
                                                                                                                 
 119. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715. 
 120. Cressman, 798 F.3d at 959. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 960. 
 123. Id. at 943. 
 124. See id. at 965 (McHugh, J., concurring). 
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line up with a few judges’ views of the reasonable observer.125 
Consequently, Cressman is forced to display the image on a daily basis to 
hundreds of people—an injustice which the First Amendment aims to 
prevent.  
F. A Symbolic Speech Solution Implicit in Hurley: A Flexible Test Going 
Forward 
Treating the Spence-Johnson factors as optional, rather than as 
prerequisites to First Amendment protection of symbolic speech, is the 
most appropriate approach when symbolic and compelled speech collide—
specifically in the realm of license plates. As illustrated by the various 
forms of symbolic expression that have come before courts, the outcome of 
symbolic speech cases is largely dictated not only by the historical and 
cultural context of the expression, but also the specific form the expression 
takes.126 Such a notion was explicitly highlighted by the Supreme Court in 
Hurley when it explained that requiring a particularized message for First 
Amendment free-speech protection would fail to include some clear forms 
of expression that require protection.127 Thus, while in some situations the 
Spence-Johnson test sufficiently determines symbolic speech, in others, the 
context is of greater relevance and the test factors are better utilized as 
persuasive support.  
The law of symbolic speech is in disarray, and although Hurley seemed 
to cause more confusion amongst lower courts, its lack of explicit direction 
can actually be interpreted as guidance by the Supreme Court.128 By 
minimizing the importance of strict adherence to the Spence-Johnson test, 
the Court recognized the need for flexibility in this context-specific area of 
law.129 The approach of allowing a citizen to object to a reasonable and 
ideological message he or she perceives is communicated by a symbol on a 
state-issued license plate complies with this recognized need for 
flexibility—a rule appropriate in the specific context of license plates. 
                                                                                                                 
 125. See id. 
 126. See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557 
(1995) (involving a petitioner seeking free-speech protection for a parade); Wooley v. 
Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (involving a petitioner seeking free-speech protection to 
refrain from displaying a license plate); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 
U.S. 503 (1969) (involving a petitioner seeking free-speech protection for wearing arm 
bands at school). 
 127. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569 (for example, a “painting of Jackson Pollock, music of 
Arnold Schoenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll”).  
 128. See cases cited supra note 6. 
 129. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 557. 
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Although Cressman relied too heavily on the second part of the Spence-
Johnson test by focusing on the narrow view of the reasonable observer, the 
Tenth Circuit’s recognition that a particularized message is not necessary 
for symbolic-speech protection was a partial adherence to the Supreme 
Court’s teachings in Hurley. But in the specific context of license plates—-
“mobile billboards” which citizens are compelled by the government to 
display on a daily basis to countless people—a court’s determination of the 
narrow message perceived by the reasonable observer should not be the 
only viable First Amendment objection a citizen may make. Instead, a 
citizen’s reasonable and ideological interpretation of the message on a 
license plate to which he or she objects should allow him or her to, at the 
very least, display a specialty license plate for the same price as the state-
issued license plate.  
 
Hayley Ray Scott 
 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol69/iss2/5
